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Shrinking Autonomy for Tatarstan and Gagauzia: The Perils of 
Flexible Institutional Design  
 
Two and a half decades after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, forms of territorialized 
ethnicity continue to feature prominently in arrangements for the management of ethno-
cultural diversity in the region. This chapter focuses on two forms of ethnicity-based 
territorial autonomy in post-Soviet states: the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia, and the 
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri – hereinafter Gagauzia) in Moldova. 
Russia and Moldova’s common Soviet past has meant the direct application of Soviet 
nationalities policy,1 leading to significant legacies, particularly in the shape of ethno-
federalism and notions of ‘institutionalized multinationality’.2 And, while the circumstances 
surrounding the establishment of the Republic of Tatarstan and Gagauzia are highly 
dissimilar, the two regions also display some commonalities in the dynamics that have shaped 
the format and levels of territorial autonomy in the post-Soviet period. Crucially, both entities 
have been confronted by an incremental reduction of their autonomy since the 1990s. The 
conditions for the undermining of territorial autonomy can be explained in light of 
institutional legacies, along with prevalent societal attitudes to legality – in the management 
of inter-ethnic relations and more generally – interacting with contemporary political 
developments in the two countries. The limited effectiveness of territorial autonomy can then 
be situated in the context of a prevalence of symbolic law and practice in diversity 
management: (post-)Soviet institutions have led to autonomy arrangements that have, in 
many cases, avoided violent conflict, but which, it is argued, have also been subject to 
manipulation in disregard of the rule of law, resulting in decreased regional autonomy. The 
‘stability’ thus ensuing is one that rests on shaky, contradictory foundations.  
This chapter will: first, outline the background to autonomy arrangements for Tatarstan and 
Gagauzia; second, it will examine the interplay of legality and non-legality (and formal and 
informal practices) in the management of diversity in the region; third, it will analyse the 
reduction in autonomy in Tatarstan and Gagauzia, linking it to institutional legacies in the 
regulation of majority-minority (and centre-regions) relations.  
Borders and Sub-State Ethnic Mobilisation 
 
 
                                                          
1 ‘Nationality’ is used in this chapter in the sense of the Russian national’nost’ – a term akin to ‘ethnicity’.  
2 R. Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An 
Institutionalist Account”, Theory and Society, 23(1) (1994), 47–78; R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: 
Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
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The first thing to note in examining territorial autonomy in the post-Soviet space is that, at 
the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the principle of uti possidetis was unquestionably 
applied.3 Thus, 15 new states emerged, and were recognized by the international community, 
on the basis of the borders of the former Soviet Union republics: among these, the former 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) transitioned to the state of Moldova, while the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSRSR) became the Russian Federation. Thus, 
while the boundaries of the Soviet Union’s territorial units might have been, in some 
instances, drawn arbitrarily, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse the principle of 
sacrosanctity of borders still prevailed.  
Post-Soviet Russia and Moldova clearly found themselves in very different positions: if 
Russians had to face the ‘loss’ of what they considered much of ‘their’ territory – with (ethnic 
Russian) compatriots becoming minorities in newly-independent states – Moldova was freed 
from the control of the Soviet government in Moscow. As Chisinau became the new centre of 
gravity for political activity, Moldovan citizens underwent shifts in the configuration of their 
identity, with the emergence of new inter-ethnic dynamics.4 Given that, as noted, Soviet 
borders remained intact, ethnic diversity within post-Soviet states had to be managed through 
supplementary (domestic) territorial, or non-territorial, arrangements, and coexist with state-
building efforts.5 Thus, the expression of ethnic identity has taken place at two levels: that of 
the state (through ‘nationalising’,6 state-building dynamics) and the sub-state level (in regions 
such as Gagauzia and Tatarstan). These two parallel processes have created complex 
dynamics; nevertheless, in both Russia and Moldova (state and sub-state) ethnic mobilisation 
was most acute in the years immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse, and later 
subsided.7 The intensity of ‘nationalising’ dynamics in Moldova, and the response from 
groups striving to resist it, has similarly decreased since the mid-1990s, while post-Soviet 
Russia has attempted to promote a process of ‘de-ethnification’, as will be seen below.  
Neo institutionalists have explained developments in the late 1980s and 1990s from the point 
of view of institutions, and the impact they have had on perceptions, including self-perception 
and identity formation.8 (Soviet) ethnic institutions, and particularly ethno-territorial 
                                                          
3 J. Hughes and G. Sasse, “Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition States”,  in J. 
Hughes and G. Sasse (eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict  (London 
and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 1-35, at 18. 
4 See, for example, C. King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Press, 1999); and M.H. Ciscel, “Language and Identity in Post-Soviet Moldova”, in B. Preisler, A. Fabricius, H. 
Haberland, S. Kjærbeck and K. Risager (eds), The Consequences of Mobility (Roskilde: Roskilde University, 
2005), 106–119. 
5 Hughes and Sasse (2002, “Comparing …”), supra, at 2. 
6 In the sense of Brubaker’s ‘nationalizing state’ - one whose ‘core nation’ considers itself an ‘unrealized’ 
nation-state because of discrimination before independence, and thereby aims at remedying this shortcoming 
and advance on the path towards nation-statehood. Brubaker (1996), supra; and R. Brubaker, “Nationalizing 
States Revisited: Projects and Processes of Nationalization in Post-Soviet States”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
34(11) (2011) 1785-1814. 
7 With regard to Russia, see E. Giuliano and D.P. Gorenburg, “The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Role of 
Ethnicity in Russian Politics, 1991-2011”, Demokratizatsiya, 20(2) (2012) 175–188. On Moldova, see, 
generally, King, supra.  
8 Brubaker (1994; 1996), supra; V. Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism 
and the State (Cambridge: CUP, 1999). 
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arrangements, became the basis for ethnic mobilisation9 – both in the case of Moldova (as it 
sought a new place for itself within the region as an independent state), and inside Russia. 
The Soviets had forged a link between ethnicity and territory, by ‘assigning’ territories to the 
Soviet Union’s larger ethnic groups – which could easily be perceived as embryonic (nation-
)states.10 Ethnicity has since been employed as a form of socio-economic (sometimes 
political) capital, with representatives of titular nationalities advancing claims on the grounds 
of ethnicity; moreover, the fact that ethnicity became embedded in the Soviet organisation of 
society, through the establishment of multiple ethnic institutions, led to what Brubaker calls 
the ‘institutionalization of nationhood’,11 which deepened ethnic consciousness in Soviet 
citizens.  
At the same time, in examining the trajectory of developments from the 1990s to the early 
2000s, Hughes and Sasse stress that institutions – particularly Soviet institutional legacy for 
the management of ethnic diversity – also played a role in furthering the conditions for 
conflict or stability.12 In fact, stability has generally prevailed: in the post-Soviet sphere there 
have been relatively few instances of eruption of violence, considering the extremely high 
levels of ethno-linguistic diversity.13 The early post-Soviet period, Hughes and Sasse argue, 
was characterised by a process of ‘de-institutionalization’ and, subsequently, one of ‘re-
instutionalization’, or the ‘reassembly of the inherited institutional legacy’, during which 
emerging political scenarios in new states frequently involved flexible arrangements that 
succeeded in eschewing conflict.14 In particular, the two authors contend that Soviet 
‘institutionalized multinationality’15 played a major role not only in the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, but also in post-Soviet state-building, by constraining nationalising projects 
(attempts to effectively create nation-states). Indeed, if Soviet ethnic institutions sharpened 
ethnic consciousness through the institutionalisation of nationhood, the ensuing nationalist 
sentiments were also forced to coexist with institutionalised multinationality – with narratives 
of a Soviet Union hosting multiple ethnic groups united by common goals. This led to a 
tension between multinationality and self-determination, which is still apparent today: thus, 
                                                          
9 D.P. Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation. Cambridge: CUP, 2003); R.G. Suny, 
The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993).  
10 This facilitated the formation of newly-independent states along the Soviet borders. See for example, Bunce, 
supra, at 84-86. 
11 This institutionalisation occurred at two levels: the ‘territorial and political’ (primarily in the shape of ethno-
federalism), and the ‘ethnocultural and personal’ – in the sense that ethnicity, which was recorded in all official 
documents and could affect education and employment opportunities, became a primary form of identification, 
with an ‘obligatory ascribed status’. Brubaker (1996), supra, at 18 (italics in original); see also Gorenburg, 
supra; and Y. Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism”, Slavic Review, 53 (2) (1994), 413-452. 
12 Hughes and Sasse (2002, “Comparing …”), supra, and J. Hughes and G. Sasse, “Conflict and 
Accommodation in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of Institutions and Regimes”, in J. Hughes and G. Sasse 
(eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict (London and Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2002), 220-240.  
13 B. Bowring, “The Russian Constitutional System: Complexities and Asymmetry”, in M. Weller (ed.) 
Asymmetrical State Design as a Tool in Ethnopolitical Conflict Resolution (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 48-74.  
14 Hughes and Sasse (2002, “Conflict…”), supra, at 232. 
15 See Brubaker (1996), supra, especially at 23ff. 
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for example, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan16 refers in its preamble both to 
‘Tatarstan’s multinational people’ and ‘the Tatar people’. Similarly, the 1993 Russian 
Constitution promulgates the sovereignty of the Russian Federation across the entire territory 
(Article 4), in tandem with the self-determination of the peoples of Russia (preamble and 
Article 5(3)).  
Post-Soviet processes of ‘de-institutionalization’ and, subsequently, of ‘re-instutionalization’ 
involved a form of institutional malleability, with a reliance on both formal and informal 
means of power-sharing; it is the resulting negotiations, which employed pliable (often 
informal) rules, that have in numerous occasions succeeded in pre-empting direct conflict, as 
in the cases of Gagauzia and Tatarstan (unlike two other notable cases in Moldova and 
Russia: Transnistria and Chechnya).17 At the same time, one can argue that the flexibility of 
post-Soviet arrangements also results in their being devoid of legal guarantees – with 
attitudes to legality that can also be at least partially regarded as a Soviet legacy.18 Thus, 
while these arrangements have provided relative stability, they have not been buttressed by 
the rule of law, and as such have been vulnerable to manipulation. In examining the period 
2000-2015 in Tatarstan and Gagauzia, the same (post-)Soviet institutions, governed by the 
same unwritten rules, have circumvented violent conflict but also created the conditions for 
reduced territorial autonomy. 
Legality and Non-Legality 
International standards on minority rights stress the importance of legal guarantees in the 
protection of minority rights – with regard to, inter alia, the promotion of minorities’ 
identity,19 protection from discrimination20 and the functioning of consultative bodies.21 
Although the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM)22 does not directly guarantee the right of persons belonging to national 
minorities to (territorial or cultural) autonomy,23 the Advisory Committee on the FCNM 
(ACFC) has pointed out that, in cases in which autonomy arrangements have been 
established, ‘they can foster a more effective participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in various areas of life’.24 For this reason, when legislation in this sphere is 
compiled or amended, ‘[i]t is important that persons belonging to national minorities be 
                                                          
16 Republics can adopt their own constitutions and state languages (Article 5(2) and 68(2) of the Russian 
Constitution). 
17 The reasons behind these conflicts are outside the scope of this chapter. 
18 On this issue, see K. Hendley, “Are Russia’s Judges Still Soviet?” Post-Soviet Affairs, 23(3) (2007) 240-274. 
19 On the need for strong legal guarantees to preserve and develop the ‘essential elements’ of national 
minorities’ identity, see for example, Switzerland, ACFC, Second Opinion on Switzerland, 2 September 2008, 
ACFC/OP/II(2008)002, §67; 80. Legal guarantees should be implemented ‘through regular dialogue’ with the 
relevant minority groups (§17). 
20 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, 
Social and Economic Life and in Public Affairs’, 27 February 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, §14, 33-35. See 
also High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), ‘Lund Recommendations on the Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life’, on self-governance arrangements and legal guarantees, §22. 
21 ACFC, (2008, ‘Commentary…), supra, §116. 
22 Moldova became a state party of the FCNM in 1996 and Russia in 1998. 
23 ACFC, (2008, ‘Commentary…), supra, §133. 
24 Ibid, §134. 
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involved and that their views be duly taken into account’.25 The 1999 Lund 
Recommendations26 go further by stating that ‘[e]ffective participation of minorities in public 
life may call for nonterritorial or territorial arrangements of self-governance or a combination 
thereof’;27 the Recommendations refer to the importance of balancing uniform, state-wide 
policies in some areas (such as defence and foreign affairs), and devolution in others.28 The 
shifting of legislative and executive functions from the centre to regions, based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, enhance the opportunities for minorities to autonomously devise 
policies on matters affecting them – such as education, culture and minority language use.29 
The ACFC has further stressed that a state’s constitutional design ‘can have a decisive impact 
on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public life’.30 Yet 
one may look more broadly at ‘institutional design’ (as Kössel points out in his contribution 
to this volume): while necessitating strong legal guarantees, institutional design in the 
regulation of majority-minority relations is not solely regulated by law, as relevant policies 
also unfold outside legal frameworks. At the same time, in both formal and informal 
arrangements, a commitment to implement relevant law and policy is paramount for their 
effectiveness.  
In the case of implementation of international standards of minority rights, the phenomenon 
of legal transplantation – the transposition of norms from an international system to a 
domestic one – further comes into play. The extent to which an exogenous system can be 
successfully ‘transferred’ is linked to a multitude of factors. In examining these processes, it 
has been argued that the legislation amounts to a ‘mirror of society’,31 and thus shapes around 
people and existing circumstances. According to this interpretation, the transplantability of 
norms is likely to occur in the presence of similarities between the donor and recipient states. 
To this view one can oppose that which sees norms’ ability to transcend borders, and be 
favourably received in countries with very dissimilar legal cultures and socio-political 
realities.32 Nevertheless, in the case of Russia it has further been argued that a number of 
human rights principles enshrined in international instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights are not novel to Russia but they have rather constituted an 
integral part of the Russian legal tradition.33 Similarly, principles in Soviet and post-Soviet 
                                                          
25 Ibid,§136. 
26 HCNM, supra. 
27 Ibid, §14. 
28 Ibid, §15. 
29 Ibid, §19-20.  
30 ACFC, (2008, ‘Commentary…), Preliminary Remarks. In turn, minority involvement in shaping government 
policies, or the autonomy to determine their own policies in specific areas, can significantly contribute to the 
accommodation of minority interests. See, for example, R. Hofmann, “Political Participation of Minorities” 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 6 (2006), 5-17. 
31 W. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants”, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 43(4) (1995) 489-510, at 492. See also O. Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of 
Comparative Law”, The Modern Law Review, 37(1) (1974) 1-27. 
32 A. A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1974). 
33 B. Bowring, “Rejected Organs? The Efficacy of Legal Transplantation, and the Ends of Human Rights in the 
Russian Federation”, in E. Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (London: British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003), 159-181. 
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programmes to promote minority languages and cultures resemble those found in the Council 
of Europe’s FCNM and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. As such they 
are not necessarily necessitating to be ‘transferred’ from ‘the West’. 
Yet specific attitudes to legality tend to restrict the practical application of these principles in 
the post-Soviet space, particularly given the limited independence of the judiciary. Indeed, 
the post-Soviet judiciary has at times been subjected to the interests of the executive or other 
forces.34 Hendley contends, with reference to Russia, that levels of freedom of the judiciary 
vary depending on whether a case is politically controversial or impacting upon the interests 
of powerful actors.35 In some instances judges have been influenced in their decisions by 
‘instructions’ handed down over the telephone, in a phenomenon known as ‘telephone 
justice’.36 It has further been argued that in countries such as Russia (neither consolidated 
democracies nor consolidates autocracies), the ‘politicization of justice’ is rife, as courts are 
incorporated into games of political competition, with ‘strategic pressure’ being applied to 
courts.37 Moreover, while international law and courts are removed from the day-to-day 
politics of individual countries, domestic law is situated within particular political contexts, 
which can (if specific safeguards are not in place) spill over into the judicial sphere.  
In Moldova, like in Russia, forms of regional autonomy, as well as the promotion of ethnic 
diversity, are guarantees by law – yet despite their legal entrenchment informal practices 
overlap with formal norms in a range of socio-political dynamics,38 including the 
management of inter-ethnic relations.39 Strong, centre-driven impulses bend legal provisions, 
with either a loose interpretation of (often unclear) legal provisions, or their direct 
contravention. For Tatarstan and Gagauzia legal safeguards have been inadequate in 
protecting territorial arrangements, which remain secondary to political priorities in Moscow 
                                                          
34 A. Czarnota, M. Krygier , W. Sadurski (eds), Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism (Budapest: 
Central European University Press,  2005); Hendley, supra; A. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); A. Trochev,  Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics, 
1990-2006 (Cambridge: CUP, 2008); P. Solomon, “Threats of Judicial Counterreform in Putin’s Russia”, 
Demokratizatsiya, 13(3) (2005) 325-345; F. Feldbrugge, Russian Law: The End of the Soviet System and the 
Role of Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); International Commission of Jurists, Reforming the Judiciary 
in Moldova: Prospects and Challenges (Geneva: ICJ, 2013). 
35 Hendley, ibid, at 267. 
36 V. Gel’man, “The Unrule of Law in the Making: The Politics of Informal Institutional Building in Russia”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 56 (7) (2004) 1021–1058; M. Krasnov, “The Rule of Law”, in  M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and 
A. Ryabov  (eds), Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 195–212; A. Ledeneva, “Behind the 
Facade: ‘Telephone Justice’ in Putin’s Russia”, in Dictatorship or Reforms? The Rule of Law in Russia 
(London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2006), 24-36; A. Ledeneva, “Telephone Justice in Russia”, Post-Soviet 
Affairs, 24 (4) (2008) 324-350. 
37 M. Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2012), at 3. 
38 D. J. Galligan and M. Kurkchiyan (eds), “Law and Informal Practices: The Post-Communist Experience” 
(Oxford: OUP 2003); Ledeneva (2006; 2008), supra; P. Solomon, supra; and P. Solomon, “Assessing the 
Courts in Russia: Parameters of Progress under Putin”,  Demokratizatsiya, 16 (1) (2008) 63–74; P. Solomon,  
“Law in Public Administration: How Russia Differs”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 24 
(1) (2008) 115–135.  
39 O. Protsyk and V. Rigamonti, “Real and “Virtual” Elements of Power Sharing in the Post-Soviet Space: The 
Case of Gagauzian Autonomy” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 6(1) (2007); F. Prina, 
National Minorities in Putin’s Russia: Diversity and Assimilation (London: Routledge, forthcoming - 2015). 
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and Chisinau. These circumstances have paved the way for the reduction of regional 
autonomy. 
 
Reducing Territorial Autonomy 
Most concessions in both Tatarstan and Gagauzia were made shortly following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, and were subsequently reduced through a combination of means. The 
delimitation of autonomy has been at two levels: first, it has concerned opportunities of 
independent decision-making in autonomous entities themselves; second, it has affected the 
exercise of participatory rights of representatives of Tatarstan and Gagauzia in Moscow and 
Chisinau respectively, with regard to policy-making affecting the autonomous regions.  
Tatarstan 
In 1990-91 a process known as the ‘parade of sovereignties’ took place, with a ‘cascade of 
declarations of sovereignty’ of Soviet republics and other administrative units.40 Yet 
Tatarstan distanced itself from other ethnic republics41 for its assertiveness. Together with 
Chechnya, Tatarstan was the only republic that refused to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty on 
the division of responsibilities between the centre and Russia’s constituent units. In a 
referendum held on 21 March 1992, 62% of the republic’s population (both ethnic Tatars and 
Russians) supported sovereignty.42 Tatarstan’s rejection of the Federation Treaty paved the 
way for the conclusion of a bilateral power-sharing treaty in February 1994,43 which foresaw 
central, shared and regional competences, but also Tatarstan’s control over much of its 
natural resources.  
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha/Yakutia were the three ethnic republics with the greatest 
bargaining powers given their wealth of natural resources (particularly oil in the case of 
Tatarstan). Tatars are also numerically the largest national minority in Russia.44 As a result, 
Tatarstan was in a favourable position to negotiate advantageous arrangements.45 And, with 
the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Tatarstan initiated its own ‘nationalising’ policies within 
the Republic of Tatarstan: it promoted the Tatar language and culture, by substantially 
                                                          
40 J. Kahn, “The Parade of Sovereignties: Establishing the Vocabulary of the New Russian Federalism”, Post-
Soviet Affairs, 16(1) (2000), 58-89. Tatarstan (then the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) declared its 
sovereignty on 30 August 1990 – already one year before the Soviet Union’s dismemberment. 
41 Republics are essentially ethnicity-based, although they are referred to in the Russian Constitution simply as 
‘republics’, rather than ‘ethnic republics’. In early 2014 Russia had 83 subjects, or territorial units, comprising: 
21 ethnic republics, 46 oblasts, nine krai, four autonomous okrugs, two federal cities (Moscow and St 
Petersburg) and one autonomous oblast (Jewish). The number of subjects rose to 85 with the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia, and the adoption of Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Republic of Crimea’s Accession to 
the Russian Federation and the Formation of New Subjects of the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea 
and Sevastopol, City of Federal Significance’, No.6-FKZ, 21 March 2014.  
42  Bowring (2010), supra. 
43 Treaty of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan ‘On the Delimitation of Areas of Jurisdictions 
and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Organs of the Russian Federation and the State Organs of 
the Republic of Tatarstan’.  
44 According to last census, in 2010 there were 5.3 million Tatars in the Russian Federation. Data available 
from: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm (accessed 22 April 2015). 
45 J. Hughes, “Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation”, in J. Hughes and G. Sasse (eds), 
Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict  (London and Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2002), 36-68. 
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expanding Tatar-language education.46 Tatarstan won a significant victory in the Russian 
Constitutional Court in 1994, when the latter confirmed the constitutionality of the provision 
in Tatarstani law that Tatar and Russian are to be taught ‘in equal measure’ within the 
republic.47 
Centre-periphery relations in Russia have not solely been shaped by ethnicity-based 
considerations: some leaders of non-ethnic regions have also been assertive.48 Even in a 
republic such as Tatarstan, with the majority of the (republic’s) population affiliated to the 
titular nationality, ethnic and regional interests have overlapped: titulars and ethnic Russians 
have shared an interest in retaining control over Tatarstan’s natural resources.49 At the same 
time, the complexities posited by ethnic federalism, and a legacy of institutionalised 
ethnicity, have led to attempts at partial ‘de-ethnification’ of the post-Soviet socio-political 
sphere. Russian (internal) passports no longer contained the requirement to indicate one’s 
ethnicity, which had been the case for Soviet passports and various other official documents; 
neither were special measures adopted to guarantee the representation of minorities in the 
public service and elected bodies. In 2006 the Russian government spelled out in a report to 
the ACFC that it was pursuing a ‘policy of de-ethnization of [the] domestic political scene’, 
in light of the fact that ‘national and ethno-cultural issues blend perfectly in the concept of 
basic civil rights’.50 The federal centre has also distanced itself from territorialised ethnicity 
by adopting a law on (non-territorial) national cultural autonomy (NCA) in 1996.51 The law, 
and official pronouncements accompanying it, made clear that it would not replace, but 
complement, territorial arrangements: indeed, the entrenchment of ethno-federalism would 
likely cause any attempt to abolish ethnic republics to be met with widespread protests, and 
possibly outbreaks of violence.52 The NCA system would rather cater for the needs of non-
                                                          
46 K. Zamyatin, “From Language Revival to Language Removal? The Teaching of Titular Languages in the 
National Republics of Post-Soviet Russia” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 11(2) 
(2012) 75-102. 
Tatar is an official language within Tatarstan. The Russian Constitution states that republics have the right to 
have their own and include official languages (‘state languages’ of the republics) alongside Russian (Article 
68(2)), as well as their own (republican) constitutions (Article 5(2)).  
47 RCC, Judgement No. 16-P, 16 November 2004. 
48 As, for example, in the case of Eduard Rossel’, governor of Sverdlovsk oblast (1995-2009), who called for 
more powers for non-ethnic regions. See G. Easter, “Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the Russian 
Federation: Sverdlovsk Oblast’”,   Europe-Asia Studies 49 (1997) 617-635. 
49 L. Hagendoom, E. Poppe, and A. Minescu, “Support for Separatism in Ethnic Republics of the Russian 
Federation” Europe-Asia Studies, 60(3) (2008) 353–373; H. Oversloot, “Reordering the State (without 
Changing the Constitution): Russia under Putin’s Rule, 2000-2008”, Review of Central and East European Law, 
32 (2007) 41-64; and H. Oversloot, “The Homogeneity of Russia, or the Remains of an Empire (Federalism and 
Regionalism)”, in O. Protsyk and B. Harzl (eds), Managing Ethnic Diversity in Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013), 87-110. As noted, both ethnic Tatars and Russians supported Tatarstan’s sovereignty in the 1992 
referendum. 
50 “Comments of the Government of the Russian Federation on the Second Opinion of the Advisory Committee 
on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Russian 
Federation”, GVT/COM/II(2006)006, 11 October 2006. In tandem with de-ethnifying moves, some groups 
espouse radical ethnic Russian nationalism, while the more moderate official patriotism, ostensibly of a civic 
nature, is however not devoid of ethnic attributes. See Prina (2015), supra. 
51 Law ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’, No. 74-FZ, 17 June 1996. 
52 V.A. Tishkov, Strategiya i Mekhanizmy Natsional’noi Politiki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Materialy Nauchno-
Prakticheskoi Konferentsii, Lipki, 1992 [Strategy and Mechanisms of National Policy in the Russian Federation: 
Materials of an Academic-Practical Conference, Lipki, 1992] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), at 18. 
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titular ethnic groups (without ‘their own’ territory), as well as members of titular minorities 
residing outside ‘their own’ ethnic regions; nevertheless, the law’s adoption clearly indicated 
a drive to shift the focus in the management of inter-ethnic relations from territoriality to non-
territorial arrangements. 53  
In the period immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse, in tandem with the mixing 
of Soviet and post-Soviet institutional arrangements, a major role in containing separatism 
was further played by Yeltsin’s presidential system and patrimonial networks.54 They 
provided a combination of informal rules, institutional malleability and, as Hughes and Sasse 
put 
 it, the ‘personalization of the bargaining process’,55 with the conclusion of ad hoc bilateral 
agreements between Yeltsin himself and individual leaders of regions.56 In this context, the 
skilful manoeuvring of Tatarstan’s president Mintimer Shaimiev, and his balancing act 
between moderate nationalism/regionalism and cooperation with the centre contributed in 
pre-empting conflict.57 By 1996 several other subjects besides Tatarstan had negotiated 
bilateral treaties (as well as adopting legislation regardless of whether it was in line with 
federal legislation). Thus, many regions displayed a predilection for the flexibility of bilateral 
treaties rather than the uniformity of the regulations contained in the 1992 Federation Treaty.  
Tatars remain Russia’s national minority in the strongest position. Two million Tatars reside 
in the Republic of Tatarstan, which makes Tatars a numerical majority within the republic 
(53.2% Tatars against 39.7% Russians).58 Overall the Russian Federation in 2010 had a 
population of 5.3 million Tatars. Moreover, Tatars have a traditional presence in Russia, their 
history having unfolded over centuries on the territory of the present Russian Federation.59 
Yet, despite its position of strength and assertiveness compared to other ethnic republics, 
Tatarstan’s autonomy has been curtailed by strong centralising impulses under the Putin 
leadership. If the powers offered by Russia’s presidentialism were fully used by Yeltsin to 
conclude bilateral agreements with regional leaders, Putin also made use of his presidential 
powers through legal and paralegal means, in order to recentralise the Federation. He pursued 
a project of legal and administrative uniformity to harmonise federal and regional legislation. 
This policy aimed at counteracting rampant decentralisation and the risk of a disintegrating 
                                                          
53 Tatars have embraced this system, thereby combining territoriality with non-territoriality in the promotion of 
the cultural rights: while pursuing autonomous arrangements within the Republic of Tatarstan, they have 
established a high number of NCAs (at the local, regional and federal levels) representing the interests of Tatars 
outside Tatarstan.  
54 Hughes and Sasse (2002, “Comparing …”), supra, at 27. 
55 Ibid, at 28. Yet the authors further note that it was these same factors that also triggered the crisis in 
Chechnya, which was characterised by ‘irreconcilable personal animosities between Yeltsin and Chechen leader 
D. Dudaev’. Ibid. 
56 Hughes and Sasse, (2002. “Conflict…”), supra, at 232. 
57 C. Williams, “Tatar Nation Building since 1991: Ethnic Mobilisation in Historical Perspective”, Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 10(1) (2011) 94-123; E. Albina, “The External Relations of 
Tatarstan: In Pursuit of Sovereignty, or Playing the Sub-Nationalist Card?”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 
5(2010) 99-124; Kahn, supra, at 70 ; Bowring (2010), supra. 
58 2010 census, supra. 
59 See for example A. Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History. Harlow: Longman, 2001; 
Gorenburg, supra. 
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federation, which had been brought about by the proliferation of bilateral treaties and 
incoherent legislation.60  
A series of measures were implemented to this end, which have altered centre-periphery 
arrangements. First, in 2000 the leaders of regions were excluded from the Federation 
Council, the Russian Parliament’s upper chamber, to be replaced by their representatives.61 
Second, in the same year Russia’s administrative units were grouped into seven presidential 
okrugs.62 Presidential envoys were tasked with the supervision of these ‘super-regions’, 
which were thereby more firmly connected to the centre.63 Third, Putin replaced 
gubernational elections with appointments.64 The latter were first introduced following the 
2004 terrorist act in Beslan (North Ossetia):65 the presidential appointment of leaders of 
Russia’s subjects was justified in a securitised context, which, it was argued, mandated a 
stronger control from the centre over the administration of the country for the purposes of 
containing terrorism.66 This unconstitutional change had far-reaching political consequences 
and as well as symbolic significance. Shaimiev, the influential president of Tatarstan, was 
initially reconfirmed in his position; however, a new president was later appointed, Rustam 
Minnikhanov (formerly the Prime Minister of Tatarstan), Shaimiev having left in 2010 the 
presidency he had held since 1991.67 In addition to not having the same political weight as a 
long-term leader such as Shaimiev, the system of appointment has meant less security in his 
position for Minnikhanov.68 Since the initial introduction of the system of gubernatorial 
appointment, the federal centre has made some democratic concessions; however, it has also 
introduced various additional changes watering down the same concessions, and ultimately 
                                                          
60 N. Petrov, “Federalism”, in M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov (eds), Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2004), 213-238, at 228. 
61 Through Law ‘On the Order of the Formation of the Federal Federation Council’, No. 113-FZ, 5 August 2000. 
One representative is appointed by the subject’s legislature and one from the executive - the latter generally a 
Kremlin-backed governor, if not directly appointed by the president of the Federation (see below). The same 
year that governors were excluded from the Federation Council, they were included in a newly-established 
body, the State Council (Presidential Decree ‘On the State Council of the Russian Federation’, No. 1602, 1 
September 2000), which however has only a consultative function. 
62 Presidential Decree ‘On the Presidential Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation in a Federal Okrug’, 
No. 849, 13 May 2000. The number of districts was increased to eight in January 2010, as the North Caucasus 
Federal Okrug was separated from the Southern Federal Okrug. 
63 Cashaback, D. “Risky Strategies? Putin’s Federal Reforms and the Accommodation of Difference in Russia”, 
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 3 (2003) 1-31, at 8. 
64 The leaders of Russia’s subjects are generally referred to as ‘governors’. The leaders of republics have 
normally had the title ‘president’, although a 2010 law required the republics’ leaders to discontinue its use and 
replace it with a generic title such as ‘head’ of republic, as per Law ‘On the Amendment of Article 18 of the 
Federal Law ‘On General Principles of the Organisation of Legal (Representative) and Executive Organs of the 
State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’’, No. 406-FZ, 28 December 2010. Article 1 states that 
the title of a republic’s leader ‘cannot contain the same words or expressions that constitute the title of the head 
of state - the president of the Russian Federation’.  
65 On 1 September 2004 Islamic militants took hostage over 1,100 people in a school in Beslan, demanding the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. The fighting between the militants and the Russian security 
forces led to the death of 334 people.  
66 ‘Speech at the Enlarged Government Meeting with the Government and Heads of the Regions’, 13 September 
2004, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/09/13/0000_type82912type82913_76667.shtml  
67 Williams (supra) however argues that Shaimiev has remained highly influential figure in Tatarstani politics. 
68 For example, 34 regional leaders were replaced only between May 2008 and October 2010 under Medvedev. 
Vedomosti, ‘Medvedev i Voevody’ [Medvedev and the Governors], 30 September 2010. 
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combining appointment with elections. The new arrangements, through the use of various 
legal technicalities, enable the centre to effectively control who leads the regions.69  
Forth, under Putin there has been a tendency for governors to be absorbed into the (oft-cited) 
‘power vertical’, particularly, since the mid-2000s, through their recruitment into the ranks of 
the ruling party, United Russia.70 Membership of United Russia has become instrumental for 
political advancement and various other benefits in Russia society,71 thereby creating the 
conditions for the co-optation of ethnic and regional leaders through patrimonial links. 
Finally, six ethnicity-based autonomous okrugs were merged with predominantly Russian 
regions in the period 2005-2008,72 and justified in on the grounds of socio-economic equality 
and optimisation of regional management.73 Safeguards relating to the preservation of the 
cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the minorities affected were included in regional 
legislation, and the former ‘autonomous okrugs’ – post-merger simply referred to as ‘okrugs’ 
–  retain a ‘special status’, although the expression has been criticised for having no meaning 
under Russian law.74  
Re-centralisation has not been met without resistance from Tatarstan. For example, Tatarstan 
has vehemently opposed the reform of the education system initiated in 2007, which has 
reduced the autonomy of regions in devising the part of the curriculum devoted to minority 
languages, history and culture.75 N>r has centralisation always been incremental and 
unidirectional. A new treaty between the centre and Tatarstan, adopted on 26 June 2007 (and 
valid for 10 years), in some respects represents an anomaly in the overall movement towards 
centralisation.76 It includes, inter alia, a requirement for candidates to the republic’s 
                                                          
69 As part of the measures used to placate mass public protests triggered by accusations of vote rigging in the 
2011 Duma elections, gubernatorial elections were reinstated in early 2012. Yet a ‘municipal filter’ was 
introduced, requiring candidates to have the support of least 5% of their subjects’ deputies (or, for independent 
candidates, to collect the signatures of at least 0.5% of the region’s population). This system has created a 
tendency for opposition candidates to be excluded from the electoral process. Legal reform in 2013 further 
introduced the option for subjects’ legislatures to cancel direct elections and instead opt for a presidential 
appointment of governors. This measure was justified on the basis of the volatile ethno-political situation in 
some regions (primarily the North Caucasus), where, it was suggested, gubernatorial elections could cause 
ethnic tensions to flare up. When elections do take place, Kremlin-backed candidates are more likely to win, 
given the administrative resources at their disposal. 
70 R. Isaacs, and S. Whitmore, “The Limited Agency and Lifecycles of Personalized Dominant Parties in the 
Post-Soviet Space: The Cases of United Russia and Nur Otan”, Democratization (2014) 21(4) 699-721, at 207.  
71 M. Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009), at 151-2. 
Even though the party’s popularity has declined, it remains unchallenged. See for example Russian Public 
Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 27-3-2014. ‘Reiting Putina: Novaya Vysota’ [Putin’s Ratings: A New 
Height], http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=268&uid=114759 (accessed 2 February 2015). 
72 Five mergers affected six ethnic regions: Komi-Permyak autonomous okrug (AO), Evenk AO, Taimyr AO, 
Koryak AO, Ust-Orda Buryat AO and Agin Buryat AO. 
73 ACFC, Third Report submitted by the Russian Federation, 9 April 2010, ACFC/SR/III(2010)005, p. 98. 
74 O. Oracheva and A. Osipov, “Territories of ‘Special Status’ in Russia: The Ethnic Dimension”, Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 26 (2) (2010), 212–232. On the mergers, see also C.C. 
Artobolevskii, O.I. Vendina, E.S. Gontmakher, N.V. Zubarevich and A.V. Kynev, Ob‘edinenie Sub’ektov 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Za i Protiv [Merging the Subjects of the Russian Federation: For and Against] (Moscow: 
INSOR, 2010); and Bowring (2010), supra.  
75 See F. Prina, “Localism or Centralism? Education Reform in Russia and Its Impact on the Rights of National 
Minorities”, Cambrian Law Review 42 (2011) 113-130. 
76 Bowring (2010), supra.  
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presidency to be fluent in both Tatar and Russian,77 and Tatarstan’s right to establish 
relations with foreign states. At the same time, it has been argued that the Tatar national 
movement has been effectively emptied of meaning.78 For example, despite the victory in the 
constitutional court noted above (on the teaching of Tatar and Russian ‘in equal measure’), in 
practice the amount of teaching of, and through the medium of, Tatar, has incrementally 
decreased since the 2000s.79  
The shrinking of territorial autonomy and the resulting limitations in the promotion of Tatar 
interests indicate a tendency for law and policy for the protection of minority rights to be 
treated as having primarily a symbolic, rather than an instrumental, role.80 For example, in 
relation to language legislation, it has been suggested that relevant legal provisions – such as 
those declaring regional languages co-official alongside Russian at the level of republics – 
never intended to be fully implemented, but merely to fulfil a symbolic function.81 Indeed, 
according to UNESCO most such languages were under threat in 2010 – from ‘vulnerable’ to 
‘severely endangered’.82 Meanwhile, the reduction of regional autonomy tends to impact 
upon the preservation of languages and cultures, including through measures such as mergers 
and the reduction of independent policy-making at the regional level. Yeltsin and Putin’s 
presidentialism and patrimonialism, while often employed with different aims, are 
characterised by the same flexibility and tendency to bend the rules to accommodate the 
leadership’s priorities; these might, or might not, coincide with regional or minority interests.  
Gagauzia 
Gagauzia provides another example of post-Soviet flexible arrangements that enabled the 
avoidance of conflict – with autonomy granted through the 1994 Law ‘On the Special 
Juridical status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri)’ (hereinafter the ‘Autonomy Statute’).83 The small 
region of Gagauzia, located in the south of Moldova, is populated primarily by Gagauz 
(82.1% of its population according to the 2004 Moldovan census – the last for which data are 
available),84 as well as Bulgarians (5.1%), Moldovans (4.8%), Russians (3.8%) and 
                                                          
77 Article 2(5). This article was included despite judgements of the Russian Constitutional Court relaxing 
requirements for leaders of regions to speak titular languages. See RCC, Judgement No.12-P, 27 April 1998, and 
RCC, Judgement No. 260-O, 13 November 2001; see also Prina (2015), supra. 
78 H. Faller, Nation, Language, Islam: Tatarstan’s Sovereignty Movement (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2011). 
79 Prina (2015), supra; K. Zamyatin, “An Official Status for Minority Languages? A Study of State Languages 
in Russia’s Finno-Ugric Republics”, Uralica Helsingiensia 6 (2014). 
80 A. Osipov, “Implementation Unwanted? Symbolic vs. Instrumental Policies in the Russian Management of 
Ethnic Diversity” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 13 (4) (2012) 425–442. 
81 Zamyatin (2014), supra. 
82 C. Moseley (ed), Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger. 3rd edition (Paris: UNESCO, 2010), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/ (accessed 14 April 2015).  
83 Law No. 344-XIII, 23 December 1994. 
84 The results of the 2014 census were still not available at the time of writing. For data from the 2004 census, 
see 2004 Population Census, ‘Demographic, National, Cultural and Language Characteristics’. Available at: 
http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=en&idc=263&id=2208 (accessed 21 April 2015). 
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Ukrainians (3.2%).85 Within Moldova as a whole, in 2004 Gagauz amounted to 4.36% of the 
population.86 
Moldova’s post-Soviet national identity has oscillated between ‘Romanist’ and ‘Moldovanist’ 
tendencies, with the absence of agreement even on the seemingly basic issue as to the name 
of the state language: ‘Romanian’ – implying closer links to Romania – or ‘Moldovan’. 
Romanist and Moldovanist tendencies broadly overlap with more or less pro-Western or pro-
Russia orientations. Moldova’s post-Soviet ‘de-institutionalization’ and ‘re-
institutionalisation’ (in the sense Hughes and Sasse give to the expressions) was 
characterised, in the early 1990s, by a drive to favour the titular group.87 Thus, Moldovan 
(often pro-Romania) and Gagauz nationalist movements diverged, with parallel processes of 
cultural awakening,88 although Gagauz nationalism might arguably have been primarily 
fuelled by the assertiveness of the titular group – through what has been aptly described as 
‘reactive nationalism’.89 Indeed, Gagauzia, like Transnistria, has been implacably opposed to 
rampant Romanisation; and, like Transnistria, it is mostly a russified region.90 The Gagauz’s 
‘own’ nationalist tendencies and acquired elements of Russianness have overlapped forming 
intricate patterns, often pro-Russian and pro-Communist.91 While the representatives of 
minorities in Moldova have been generally fluent in Russian, which was employed as lingua 
franca during the Soviet period, they have frequently had low levels of knowledge of 
Romanian/Moldovan.92 Russian has been the main language of communication of the Gagauz 
                                                          
85 And 0.9% ‘others’.  
86 In the 2004 census 75.81% of the population self-identified as Moldovan, 8.35% as Ukrainian, 5.95% as 
Russian, 2.17 % as Romanian, 1.94% as Bulgarian and 1.32% as ‘other’ (including Roma). The 2004 census did 
not include data from Transnistria. 
87 Hughes and G. Sasse (2002. “Conflict…”), supra, at 231. 
88 In 1989 a Gagauz cultural club was established in Comrat, which later developed into the political 
organisation Gagauz Halki. See King, supra, at 215; and C. Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: 
The Case of the Gagauz Territorial Autonomy in the Republic of Moldova”, in: K. Gal (ed.), Minority 
Governance in Europe (Budapest: LGI/ECMI, 2002), 105-123, at 109.  
89 J. Chinn and S. D. Roper, “Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova”, 
Nationalities Papers 23(2) (1995) 291-325. 
90 C. King, supra, at 211-213. 
91 I. Katchanovski, “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean 
Tatars and the Gagauz”, Europe-Asia Studies 57(6) (2005), 877-894 The political orientation of Gagauzia has 
tended to favour Communist or independent candidates. Yet after 2001, when the Communist Party won the 
national elections, relations with the Communist Party became less amicable, as the latter attempted to reduce 
the autonomy of the region. S. Wöber, Making or Breaking the Republic of Moldova? The Autonomy of 
Gagauzia, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (Bolzano/Bozen: EURAC, 2013), at 15. In the 2010 
Moldovan parliamentary elections 59.9% of votes cast in Gagauzia went to the Communist Party, down from 
77.8% in the previous elections. The 2012 elections to the People’s Assembly in Gagauzia saw the election of 
25 independent candidates, 8 candidates from the Communist Party, and 3 from the Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Moldova. See “Itogovye Resultaty Vyborov v Narodnoe Sobranie Gagauzii” [Final Results of the Elections to 
the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia], 24 September 2012, Gagauzia Autonomous Territorial Unit official site, 
http://www.gagauzia.md/newsview.php?l=ru&idc=390&id=3751 (accessed 17 April 2015). In the March 2015 
elections for governor of Gagauzia, victory went to pro-Russia (and Russia-supported) candidate Irina Vlah. See 
Teleradio Moldova, “New Governor of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah, Invested”, 15 April 2015, available at 
http://www.trm.md/en/politic/in-gagauzia-are-loc-investirea-in-functie-a-noului-guvernator-al-regiunii-irina-
vlah/ (accessed 17 April 2015). 
92 Limited progress has been made in expanding the knowledge of the state language among the citizenry since 
independence. See for example ACFC, Third Opinion on Moldova, 11 December 2009, 
ACFC/OP/III(2009)003, §27. 
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regional authorities,93 and most of Gagauzia’s schools have continued to operate in Russian, 
with no school teaching the full school curriculum in Gagauz. Thus, Moldova’s pronounced 
Romanist tendencies of the late 1980s and early 1990s – with the introduction of ‘Moldovan’ 
as the country’s sole official language94 and calls for Moldova’s unification with Romania – 
led to widespread alarm in Transnistria and Gagauzia, ultimately leading to Transnistria’s 
separation from the rest of Moldova in 1992.  
Gagauzia represents an highly exceptional case in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, 
by which territorial autonomy was granted by law to an ethnic group. As such the resulting 
autonomy arrangements have been generally treated as a positive example,95 particularly in 
light of the Transnistrian ‘frozen conflict’ next door. In 1994 Chisinau 
 and Comrat (Gagauzia’s capital) managed to reach basic consensus on a legal framework,96 
with hardly any international mediation.97 According to the Autonomy Statute, changes to the 
legislation governing the region may be amended only through the vote of a three fifth 
majority in the Moldovan parliament.98 Gagauzia’s local parliament is the People’s Assembly 
(Halk Toplu_u), consisting of 35 deputies with law-making powers in the spheres of 
education, culture, local budget and territorial administration.99 The People’s Assembly can 
participate in devising Moldova’s policies and the Governor of Gagauzia (Ba_kan) is also a 
member of the central government.100 In the event that the Moldovan legislative and 
administrative authorities infringe the rights of the autonomous region of Gagauzia, the latter 
can refer the matter to the Moldovan Constitutional Court.101   
However, Protsyk argues that autonomy was granted to Gagauzia under substantial (internal 
and external) pressure to resolve mounting tensions in the region. It occurred at a time when 
the Moldovan state was in a weak, politically uncertain position given the recent transition 
from Soviet Union republic to independent state. As the central authorities became stronger, 
Gagauz autonomy has been weakened rather than institutionalised.102 Legal provisions on the 
distribution of competences between the centre and the autonomy have remained vague,103 
                                                          
93 Ibid, §118-9. 
94 The Moldovan Constitution stipulates at Article 13(1) that the state language of the country is ‘Moldovan’, 
written in the Latin alphabet. The 1989 Law on Languages, adopted shortly prior to the dissolution of the USSR 
(and still in force) provides that Russian is the language of ‘inter-ethnic communication’ (Article 3).  
95 P. Järve, “Gagauzia and Moldova: Experiences in Power-Sharing”, in M. Weller and B. Metzger (eds), 
Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 
96 Neukirch, supra, at 110; S. D. Roper, “Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia”, in 
J. Hughes and G. Sasse (eds), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict (London 
and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 101-122, at 117-118. The Moldovan Constitution recognises Gagauzia as 
an ‘autonomous territorial unit having a special statute’ (Article 111(1)).  
97 Wöber, supra, at 13. 
98 Article 111(7), Moldovan Constitution. 
99 Articles 7, 11 and 12, Autonomy Statute. The executive authority of Gagauzia is the Executive Council 
(Bakannik Kometeti) (Articles 16-18). 
100 Article14(4), Autonomy Statute. 
101 Article 12(3)(4), Autonomy Statute. In turn, Article 12(6) states that Gagauz provisions that are in conflict 
with the Moldovan Constitution will be declared null. 
102 O. Protsyk, “Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: the Real and the Virtual in Post-Soviet State Design”, in M. 
Weller and K. Nobbs (eds), Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 231-251; see also Roper, supra, at 118.  
103 Despite the adoption of new legislation since 1994, such as the 1998 Code of Gagauzia (see below). 
15 
 
and subject to differing, contrasting interpretations.104 The central authorities have passed a 
proliferation of legislative acts that are nor fully in line with the Autonomy Statute, or 
without consideration for the special arrangements foreseen by law for Gagauzia.105 
I refer to four such instances. First, 1998 amendments of the 1991 Moldovan Law on Political 
Parties and Socio-Political Organisations introduced the requirement for a party to have a 
minimum of 5,000 members from half of Moldova’s districts, with at least 150 members in 
each, in order to be registered; this made it impossible for ethnic Gagauz parties to 
function.106 This law was superseded by a new Law on Political Parties, adopted in 2007, 
which retained similarly restrictive provisions concerning membership.107 Further, the 2007 
law directly prohibits the establishment of political parties on the basis of ethnic origins.108 
Second, Article 111 of the Moldovan Constitution, added in 2003 and entrenching the 
autonomy status of Gagauzia, has however failed to strengthen it: pursuant to the said 
provision, the Moldovan government is to guarantee the conformity of Gagauz legislation 
with Moldovan law, despite the Authority Statute’s (above-mentioned) stipulations on 
Gagauzia’s authority to legislate independently.109 Third, the Moldovan Law on Territorial-
Administrative Organisation of 30 December 1998 raised widespread concern in Gagauzia, 
when it introduced provisions on the nomination of a prefect in each administrative unit of 
Moldova (including Gagauzia). Although the law did not foresee that the prefect would have 
the authority to interfere in regional affairs, the new position would assure central supervision 
of the regions – an arrangement that seems incompatible with regional autonomy;110 this law 
was however repealed in 2001.111 Fourth, the scope of the Autonomy Statute was restricted 
by the Moldovan Constitutional Court on 6 May 1999, when it declared unconstitutional its 
Article 20(2), stipulating that the People’s Assembly can submit recommendations to the 
president of Moldova on the appointment of judges in Gagauzia.112 These measures have 
caused the scope of autonomy arrangements to shrink, while effectively placing Gagauzia in 
a position not dissimilar from Moldova’s ordinary districts.  
Meanwhile, there have been scarce efforts to implement the provisions of the Autonomy 
Statute,113 due to what has been called a ‘weak sense of obligation or commitment’ by 
                                                          
104 ACFC (2009, Third Opinion on Moldova…), supra, §33; 178.  
105 Protsyk, supra; Järve, supra; Neukirch, supra, at 114. 
106 I. Osonian and O. Protsyk, Ethnic or Multi-Ethnic Parties? Party Competition and Legislative Recruitment in 
Moldova, ECMI Working Paper No. 47 (Flensburg: ECMI, 2010), at 7.  
107 While making them slightly less stringent: 4,000 members overall (down from 5,000) with 120 members 
(down from 150) in each county.  See Article 8(1).  
108 Article 3(6). These provisions were criticised by the ACFC: ACFC, First Opinion on Moldova, 1 March 
2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)002, §49; and ACFC (2009, Third Opinion on Moldova…), supra, §96-7. 
109 Although Article 111 of the Constitution provides that the Gagauz people are to ‘independently solve, within 
the limits of its competence […] the political, economic and cultural issues’ (§1), it further states that ‘[t]he 
control over the observance of the Republic of Moldova legislation within the autonomous territorial-unit of 
Gagauzia shall be performed by the Government under the terms of the law’ (§6). See also Protsyk and 
Rigamonti, at 10-11. 
110 Neukirch, supra, at 115; see also United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 
“Republic of Moldova: Public Administration Country Profile”, December 2003.  
111 Though the adoption of the new Law on Territorial Administrative Organisation of 27 December 2001, 
which abolished prefectures. 
112 Neukirch, supra, at 112. The Moldovan Constitution makes no reference to possible recommendations.   
113 Wöber, supra, at 19. 
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Chisinau to devolve major policy competencies.114 Many of the legal provisions regulating 
the status of Gagauzia operate primarily at a symbolic level. This applies to, among others: 
the recognition of the Gagauz people’s right to their land;115 external self-determination 
(Article 1(4) of the Autonomy Statute); the right of legislative initiative in Moldova’s 
parliament (Article 73 of the Constitution);116 and the Code of Gagauzia itself – adopted by 
Gagauzia on 14 May 1998, and serving as a ‘constitution’ for the region – along with other 
symbols of ‘statehood’ such as the Gagauz flag and anthem.117 One could add to the list the 
recognition of Gagauz as an official language of Gagauzia (together with Moldovan and 
Russian),118 while de facto Russian remains predominant in the region. Moreover, persons 
belonging to the Gagauz minority have limited representation in government structures and 
the parliament in Chisinau.119 The capital’s coalition governments has arguably paid little 
attention to Gagauzia’s concerns, in the presence of other priorities - particularly European 
integration and the country’s economic difficulties.120  
Relations between Chisinau and Comrat have remained strained.121 Among other things, 
tensions sparked around the 2011 results of secondary school examinations in Gagauzia, 
when numerous students of Gagauz ethnic background, who had studied in Russian schools, 
failed to pass the Romanian-language test and were not issued diplomas.122 The Gagauz 
authorities proceeded to issue their own diplomas, defying the central authorities – an act that 
was declared illegal by the Ministry of Education.123 Moreover, the population of Gagauzia 
has tended to disagree with the pro-Europe choice of the ruling coalition.124 While Gagauz 
(like Tatar) is a Turkic language, and some Gagauz have migrated to Turkey in search of 
employment, it is the traditional links with Russia that continue to prevail. Russia is 
overwhelmingly seen as instrumental to address the needs of Gagauzia as an economically 
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land, by referring to the ‘juridical status’ of ‘Gagauz Yeri’ – or ‘Gagauz land’. J. Chinn and S. D. Roper, 
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117 Neukirch, supra, at 114. 
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interests are also represented in Chisinau - both in parliament and government structures. Wöber, supra, at 29; 
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120 Wöber, supra, at 17-20. 
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factions. Ibid, at 17; 20-21. 
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[Graduates of Gagauzia who failed Romanian will not receive secondary school diplomas]. Unimedia, 27 July. 
Available at: http://unimedia.info/stiri/absolventii-din-gagauzia--care-au-picat-la-romana--nu-vor-primi-
diplome-de-bac-37041.html. 
123 C. Ciurea, Linguistic Policies of Chisinau in Relation to UTA Gagauzia, Policy Brief (Chisinau: Institute for 
Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) ‘Viitorul’, 2011). 
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parliamentary elections. Previous coalitions were the Pro-European Coalition (2013-2015) and the Alliance for 
European Integration (2009-2013), which replaced the Communist government (2001-2009). 
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deprived region, through financial remittances from, and trade with, Russia. While not all 
Gagauz are opposed to European integration,125 in a referendum held on 2 February 2014, 
97.2% of Gagauzia’s residents voted against it, and 98.4% in favour of joining the Russia-
sponsored Eurasian Customs Union.126 Gagauzia’s executive has repeatedly requested 
official documents from Chisinau to be sent to Comrat in Russian rather than in the state 
language.127 Thus, Gagauzia can be treated as an example of the Soviet legacy of 
multinationality – albeit with one de facto lingua franca – acting as a constraining factor to 
the creation of a ‘mono-culture’ through the exclusive promotion of the titular nationality.128  
These complexities have affected the smooth functioning of autonomy arrangements. 
Gagauzia has at times strived to reverse the trend towards the reduction of its autonomy, 
including by attempting to expand its powers through the adoption of regional legislation.129 
However, it has been generally unsuccessful, given the very restricted scope of action to 
demand genuine autonomy. The Comrat executive has had to (more or less reluctantly) accept 
its weak position vis-à-vis Chisinau, and the fact that a belligerent attitude would likely be 
counterproductive.130 Indeed, Chisinau can rely on informal mechanisms to control the 
Gagauz leadership, including through pressure on the judiciary and selective enforcement of 
the legislation.131 Particularly telling have been instances of criminal charges brought against 
governors of Gagauzia by the central government, which have led to the resignation of a 
governor.132 In practice the central authorities are in the position to coerce governors into 
subservience if needed, substituting confrontation with co-optation.133 The absence of violent 
conflict despite existing tensions can further be attributed to Gagauzia’s financial dependence 
on the centre.134 Hence, the autonomy arrangement of Gagauzia, reached thanks to 
Moldova’s institutional flexibility, is however so elastic to be devoid of firm safeguards to 
assure genuine devolution.  
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Formuzal had accused the incumbent, Gheorghii Tabunshchik, of an excessively conciliatory approach to 
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133 Protsyk and Rigamonti, supra, at. 12-14. 
134 Protsyk, supra. Unlike Transnistria, Gagauzia had also not intended to secede from Moldova. See King, 
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Conclusion 
(Post-)Soviet institutions and their flexibility, interacting with socio-political circumstances at 
the domestic level – particularly presidentialism and patrimonialism in Russia, and a 
‘nationalising state’ combined with Gagauzia’s dependence on the centre in Moldova – have 
provided the conditions for the pre-emption of violent conflict in most instances. This has led 
to arrangements that include territorial autonomy, bilateral treaties and power-sharing 
agreements. Among other things, Soviet ethnic institutions have created a proclivity for 
multinationality based on the coexistence of multiple ethnic groups, which acts to at least 
partially reign in nationalising projects and the potential imposition of a ‘mono-culture’.  
Autonomy arrangements are legally entrenched in Russia and Moldova. Yet, while the law 
can be ‘part of the solution’ in facilitating the defusing of possible tensions in majority-
minority relations, it can also be ‘part of the problem’ when it is overly flexible. Law can fail 
to protect minorities when it is overly elastic, or can even be interpreted to their detriment. 
Even when not directly abused, legislation in Russia and Moldova is generally ill-equipped to 
resolve possible majority-minority disputes given its overly declarative nature. This has led to 
a generally ungenerous reading of the law, and to informal practices interacting with formal 
norms in a manner that tends to adversely affect minorities. Laws have an element of 
volatility given their frequent (and ad hoc) amendment, while those minority rights that are 
enshrined in the law are often confined to simply having a symbolic value given their scarce 
implementation. Political institutions do not tend to provide essential checks and balances, 
while the judiciary is not guaranteed the ability to operate free from external pressures. 
Hence, the same institutional flexibility that has often enabled the peaceful resolution of 
tensions has also created a legal environment in which minority groups territorially 
concentrated tend to be deprived of safeguards of their autonomy. While a degree of stability 
has been reached, it is short of genuine devolution – a situation that acts to constrain the 
degree of accommodation of minority concerns and regional interests. 
Indeed, both Russia and Moldova display a predilection for a state-centric approach. Both 
Tatarstan and Gagauzia – where ethnic and regional interests have overlapped – have also 
been characterized by institutional malleability and the use informal practices. In the case of 
Tatarstan, elite bargaining between Yeltsin and Shaimiev resulted in the 1994 power-sharing 
arrangement. Yet Russia’s strong centralizing impulses, particularly under the Putin 
leadership, have continued to curtail the autonomy of the regions, including Tatarstan. 
Moldova, in its position of a politically fragile newly-independent state, granted territorial 
autonomy to Gagauzia, but short of real devolution. Chisinau’s priorities – including its 
nationalising project, along with security concerns – have sidelined regional Gagauz interests. 
Thus, the territorial autonomy granted to Gagauzia in 1994 only partially resolved tensions, 
while principally recasting them in a different form.  
In the presence of an institutional design for the management of majority-minority relations, 
there is however little political will to implement relevant law and policy. The recognition of 
ethnicity-based territorial formations, and its symbolic value, may have a stabilising effect; 
this form of territorial autonomy has however stagnated at a point that prevents advancement 
in the promotion of territorial or cultural autonomy. Symbolic cultural recognition does not 
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allow minorities to penetrate the political sphere, and effectively participate in policy-
making, with regard to autonomy at the regional level and input into decision-making on the 
country as a whole. Osipov calls this approach a ‘culturalization of the social’, 135 in the sense 
that cultural notions are applied to a range of socio-political issues linked to ethnicity with a 
view to maintaining ethnicity outside the domain of politics; this allows for the avoidance of 
public debates on controversial and potentially destabilising subjects.136 In a similar vein, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), in relation to Russia, has referred 
to the ‘folklorisation’ of minorities – in the sense of minority issues being approached 
primarily as folklore,137 rather than cultural (and political) rights per se. Meanwhile, the 
presence of informal practices – including informal means of control – in the two regions 
suggest that ethnic relations in the post-Soviet space can be best explained from a neo-
patrimonialist perspective.138 Measures affecting Tatarstan (centralization and Russia’s ‘de-
ethnicising’ project) and Gagauzia (reduction of its powers as an ethnic minority region) 
further indicate a drive to dilute territorialised ethnicity. The incremental erosion of ethnicity-
based territorial autonomy suggests a gradual shift in the conceptualization of post-Soviet 
territoriality, with a movement towards its de-coupling from ethnicity in practice, while 
however maintaining a symbolic link with it.  
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